IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Policies: Cooperation or Conflict?
by Karl Wohlmuth, Bremen* The adjustment crisis of the oil-importing developing countries has raised the question as to the specific roles of the IMF and the World Bank in the process of structural adjustment and the actual relationship between their different concepts and programmes, What are the areas of cooperation and conflict between these two institutions and what must alternative concepts for structural adjustment and conditionality take into consideration? I n the early 1970s it became evident that the dramatic world economic changes required drastic modification to IMF adjustment policies in the oil-importing developing countries and that new policies and instruments had to be invented. The "large increases and marked shifts in external payments imbalances~ called for a blend of adjustment and financing different from that formerly incorporated in stand-by arrangements". 1 Consequently, the IMF established' temporary financing arrangements, such as the oil facility, to provide low conditionality resources to its~ members.
The IMF's Extended Fund Facility
The IMF also established the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974, designed to help countries with (i) severe payments imbalances owing to structural maladjustments in production and trade, and (ii) imbalances owing to a combination of slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position constraining the country's pursuit of active development policies. 2 After the second oil price shock, the IMF, increasingly emphasized adjustment programmes compatible with and furthering structural changes. Longer periods of adjustment and larger amounts of ~ assistance were considered to be necessary. The IMF concentrated more and more on high conditionality, programmes within a medium-term framework at the expense of low conditionality facilities.
* University of Bremen. This article is based on a lecture given at a 'Working Group Meeting on Structural Adjustment Policies of the IMF and.the IBRD, Fnedrlch-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, May 1984.
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The years 1979 to 1981 showed a great expansion in the volume of EFFs (see Table 1 ) and of one-year and multi-year stand-bys under a medium-term framework. There was a clear understanding in the IMF at this time that "adjustment" meant an improvement of the balance of payments situation via fundamental economic policy, changes so that a "viable" balance of payments position could be restored. The "viable" balance of payments position was defined as a deficit on the current account which can be financed by capital imports consistent with longer-run development perspectives, so that the debtservicing capacity of the country is taken care of. It was the view of the IMF that a viable balance of payments position should be realized without endangering the, growth prospects and development perspectives of the developing countries pursuing adjustment policies. The IMF considered it more and more important to complement demand management policies by supplyside policies 3 and also by measures to ensure better, cooperation with the World Bank at all operational levels. 4
In 1981 the Indian EFF loan implied a decisive turnaround. This EFF had strong elements of supply-1 M. G u i t i a n : Fund Conditionality. Evolution of Principles and' Practices, Pamphlet Series No. 38, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 1981, p. 17. 2 Ibid., p. 19. 3 Ibid., p. 26f. 4 On the collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank see M. G u'i t u a n, op. cit., p. 27; and on the evolution of collaboration, Joseph G o I d : The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in: Creighton Law Review, Vol. 15, 1981 -1982 
